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June, 1953
PITFALLS IN THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES
EDWARD C. KING,
Dean, University of Colorado School of Law
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following is an address made at a meeting of
the Denver Bar Association on March 2, 1953.
I am going to talk about some problems which arise in the
administration of estates and trusts. Actually these problems con-
stitute pitfalls, or traps, into which the unwary, inexperienced,
or ill-advised fiduciary* may fall.
I speak of pitfalls, but bear in mind that what may be a pit-
fall for the fiduciary may be a windfall for the beneficiary or for
a third person who has a claim against the estate. This being
true, some of you may be interested in these problems from the
fiduciary's point of view, some from the point of view of an at-
torney representing a beneficiary, and some from the point of
view of an attorney suing on behalf of a third person.
We are going to deal with problems affecting executors, ad-
ministrators and trustees. Generally, however, when I speak of
one of these officers it includes, so far as liability is concerned, the
others. All are fiduciaries, all administer property for the benefit
of others, all act as principals not as agents, and all are held to
a high degree of responsibility. Certainly no one should accept
any of these offices, and no attorney should assume the responsi-
bility of giving advice with respect thereto, unless he knows a
great deal about this subject. Most of the pitfalls, or traps, which
a trustee may encounter result from the numerous duties he owes
to the beneficiaries, and the fact that a violation of any of these
duties constitutes a breach of trust. There is, for example, the
duty of loyalty, the duty not to delegate authority, the duty to
exercise reasonable care and skill in the administration of the
trust, the duty to preserve the trust property, and the duty to
enforce claims. Additional dangers arise from the fact that trus-
tees are often regarded as the owners of property, and also from
the fact that many people, including too many lawyers, think of
a trustee, or an executor, or an administrator, as an agent for
someone. They think of him as acting in a representative capacity
whereas he is not an agent. He acts as an individual and, as a
rule, his liabilities are the same as an individual acting for his
own benefit.
Here are some of the traps. To some of you they may be new;
to others they will only serve as reminders that danger exists.
The first of these traps or problems is based on the rule of
law that a trustee is personally liable to third persons for torts




committed in the administration of the trust to the same extent
that he would be liable if he owned the property in his own right.
This is true whether the fiduciary committed the tort intentionally,
or negligently, or without fault, and whether or not he acted in
accordance with the terms of the instrument creating the relation-
ship.
Here is an illustration. A owned a garage that was managed
by B. A died and his will authorized his executor, D (afterwards
defendants), to continue the garage business with said B as man-
ager. The State law also authorized an executor to carry on a
decedent's business. During the administration of the estate P
(plaintiff) drove his car into the garage and as he did so the
sliding door came down and cut off the end of P's nose.
After the estate was closed, D the executor, discharged, and
the assets of the estate distributed to T, a trustee, P, the injured
person, brought suit for damages against D the former executor,
individually and as executor. He also joined T, the trustee to
whom the assets had been distributed.
T, the distributee, demurred. The demurrer was sustained.
D was left as the sole defendant. Then, despite the fact that D
had acted within his powers in continuing the operation of the
garage, that he was not personally at fault, and that he was no
longer executor, a verdict for $87,000.00 was rendered against
him personally and individually.
The case then went to the Supreme Court of California. There
it was held that the executor was personally liable for torts com-
mitted by the employees of the business operated by the executor,
even though the will and the State statute authorized him to con-
tinue the business. This was under the doctrine of respondeat
superior. The Court said that an estate is not a legal person or
entity and after distribution and discharge it no longer exists;
that an executor or trustee is not like an officer of a corporation,
free from liability if not at fault. It is the executor or trustee,
individually and personally, who acts or fails to act. The Court
added that usually there is a right of reimbursement; that is, that
this unfortunate D after being compelled to pay the $87,000.00,
might be able to get it back from T, who now had the trust assets,
but said the answer to that question depended upon whether or
not the executor was at fault, or whether the distributee had so
changed his position since distribution that it would be inequitable
to charge him. It was not decided in the California case that
D could recover from the trust estate. He was held liable indi-
vidually for the $87,000.00.1
Here is trap number two. It is the duty of a fiduciary to
procure such insurance on the trust property as is customarily
taken out by prudent men with respect to their own property.
Refer again to the garage case. We found that the injured
person could recover $87,000.00 from D, the former executor,
' Johnston v. Long, 181 P (2d) 645 (1947).
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individually. We also found that D, if not at fault, might be able,
to obtain reimbursement from the assets which he had distributed
to T the testamentary trustee. But was D not at fault in failing
to take out liability insurance? It would appear-although this
is hypothetical, it is not in the decided case-that his failure to
take out adequate liability insurance to cover the garage consti-
tuted a breach of trust and that, therefore, he was at fault and
would not be able to recover from T, the trustee to whom the
estate was distributed.
One of the first duties of an attorney representing a fiduciary
should lie to advise the fiduciary of the importance of adequate in-
surance (liability and fire).
Trap number three is another dangerous situation. It is a
well established rule that a trustee is personally liable upon con-
tracts made by him in the administration of the trust, unless the
contract expressly stipulates that he shall not be so liable.
Take the garage case again. This is hypothetical, but as I
have given the facts once I will use them to illustrate. Assume
the following facts:
(1) T, the distributee, is now acting as testamentary trustee
under the will.
(2) T was authorized to continue and did continue the opera-
tion of the garage.
(3) T decided to enlarge and build an addition to the garage.
(4) T made a contract which he signed, "T, as trustee under
the last will and testament of A, deceased", and by which
he agreed to pay the contractor $70,000.00 for the con-
struction of the addition to the garage.
(5) While the addition was being built business turned bad,
the trust estate went into debt, and there were no longer
any substantial assets in the trust estate.
(6) The contractor presents his $70,000.00 bill to T, the
trustee.
T is liable individually, just as if he had contracted on his
own behalf. The fact that he signed the contract as trustee does
not free him from liability. He may, or may not, be able to reim-
burse himself from the trust estate.
That a trustee is personally liable on his contracts is well
established. It is so stated in Section 262 of the Restatement of
Trusts. He is personally liable for his contracts for all purchases
and services, including legal services. He is probably personally
liable on notes signed by him in behalf of the estate, even though
he borrows money with full authority.
The leading American case is Taylor v. Davis, as Administra-
tor,2 and followed in scores of cases. In that case the Supreme
Court summed up the rule as follows:
2 110 U. S. 330 (1883).
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A trustee is not an agent. An agent represents and
acts for his principal. . . . When an agent contracts in
the name of his principal, the principal contracts and is
bound, but the agent is not. When a trustee contracts
as such, unless he is bound no one is bound, for he has
no principal. The trust estate cannot promise; the con-
tract is therefore the personal undertaking of the trustee.
And the same is true of executors and administrators. Even
if an executor signs a contract pursuant to an order of court he
still is personally bound. He may or may not be able to obtain
exoneration from the estate. But any right to exoneration or
payment from the estate is derivative and arises only from the
relationship between the fiduciary who is personally liable, and
the assets of the trust estate.
For similar reasons title should never be taken in the name
of the estate of anybody. Corporate stock should never be regis-
tered in the name of an estate. An estate is not a legal entity.
Some of you may question some of these statements but I think
there is ample authority throughout the United States for all these
propositions.
There is, however, a conflict of authority as to the personal
liability of a trustee who signs a negotiable instrument in such a
way as to disclose the fact that he is trustee for a designated
estate, as for example, "John Doe, as trustee under the will of
Richard Roe, deceased." Section 20 of the Negotiable instruments
Law was intended to relieve trustees disclosing the trust from such
liability, but the wording is ambiguous.
Some of the courts interpret the Negotiable Instrument Act
as freeing him from personal liability. Others say that he is per-
sonally liable. So far as I know there has been no decision in
Colorado but it is well to assume that there is responsibility.
Now is there any way in which you can protect the trustee
against personal liability on contracts and notes? There is a way.
Put in your contract or on your note, "It is expressly stipulated
and agreed that the trustee shall not be personally liable upon
this undertaking and that the other contracting party shall look
solely to the assets of the trust estate which may from time to
time be in the hands of the trustee," or have him sign it as trus-
tee and then add the words, "But not individually". At any rate,
use language clearly indicating that he is not binding himself indi-
vidually but only as a fiduciary.
Trap number four is a particularly mean one. It is best illus-
trated by the leading Minnesota case of McLaughlin v. Minnesota
Loan and Trust Company.3 The facts were that Minnesota real
estate was leased for a 100 years, with covenants, running with
the land, calling for payment of rents, taxes, assessments, etc. In
1926 one Short owned the leasehold. After his death the leasehold
3255 N. W. 839 (1934).
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passed by will to the trust company as testamentary trustee, and
was accepted. It then turned out that the trust estate was in-
solvent and the reversioner (the owner of the land subject to the
lease) brought suit to enforce the covenants against the trust
company in its individual corporate capacity. It was held that
the trust company was liable, the court saying that at law a trus-
tee is regarded as the owner with all the rights and subject to
all the liabilities of ownership. The trustee is liable or no one is
liable. The trust estate itself cannot be liable to suit, and is but
the fund out of which the trustee may reimburse himself for
proper expenditures.
An administrator, also, is the owner of the personal property
of his intestate and is subject to the liabilities incident to owner-
ship. It makes no difference whether the property is a horse, a
watch, an automobile, or a dog, as was strikingly illustrated when
an administrator, who by virtue of his office became the owner of
intestate's dog, was held liable for damages occasioned when the
dog bit a ten year old boy.
4
Trap number five may arise because of* situations created by
the Rule Against Perpetuities.
Here is what you might call the "discretionary authority
trap." There are a great many trusts in which the trustee is given
discretionary authority to use income, or income and principal,
for the support, maintenance, and education of children, or mem-
bers of a family, of a person creating a trust.
Suppose I create an irevocable living trust with the X Bank.
I create it today. I have two children and I authorize the trustee
to use as much of the income or principal, or both, as the trustee
deems necessary for the education and support of my children
now living or hereafter born until the youngest reaches the age
of twenty-five and then to distribute the balance of the trust estate
to my Uncle Joe, we will say, or to the children.
The trustee, in the exercise of his discretion, uses the income
and principal for the benefit of my children, and finally exhausts
the estate. Then I die and then my creditors or Uncle Joe come in
and demand of the trustee the entire trust estate, including all of
the income earned during the administration of the trust.
It appears that the trustee would be liable for the entire prin-
cipal and income. Why? Because the trust violated the Rule
against Perpetuities. The rule is that a discretionary power, such
as I have just mentioned, is void, as violating the Rule against
Perpetuities, if it can be exercised at a time beyond the period
of the rule. When I created the irrevocable living trust for my
children now living or hereafter born and permitted the discre-
tionary power to continue until afterborn children, if any, reach
twenty-five, it violated the rule and was bad in its entirety.
In drafting wills for your clients, or in administering a trust,
look out for that discretionary authority, because in any case
'Adams v. Star, 49 A. 897 (1901).
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where it may be exercised in favor of persons not yet born it is
very likely that it violates the Rule against Perpetuities.
There are a number of other traps which are related to the
Rule against Perpetuities and arise from dangerous misconcep-
tions. For instance, there is a common belief that if title is vested
in anyone, a trustee for example, the rule isn't violated. The
Colorado Supreme Court said so on one occasion. But that is not
true. It doesn't avoid the Rule against Perpetuities to have the
title vested in a trustee. The beneficial interests must vest within
the period or they are bad.
There is another belief that the Rule against Perpetuities has
to do only with restraints against alienation, and if there are exist-
ing persons who can convey absolute and indefeasible title the
rule is not violated. But that also is not true. For example, sup-
pose that you convey Blackacre to John Doe and his heirs with a
proviso that if liquor is ever sold on the premises the property
shall go to Richard Roe and his heirs. Although John and Richard,
by joining in a conveyance, can give an absolute and indefeasible
title, the interest of Richard violates the Rule against Perpetuities
and John has a fee simple absolute. Richard's interest does not
vest until liquor is sold on the premises and this may not be until
a time later than lives in being plus twenty-one years.
In that general connection, but not with respect to estates, I
might mention another situation. A man sold real estate, and
reserved an option to repurchase the property at any time within
25 years upon the payment of $10,000. The option is void. It
violates the Rule against Perpetuities because it may be exercised
at a time beyond lives and twenty-one years.
Here is another dangerous situation. Ordinarily a trustee
may not deviate from the terms of the trust. That is, if a trust
instrument says that he shall retain the stock of American Tele-
phone Company he has to retain it and if he sells is liable for a
loss. But suppose that X is administering a trust under the terms
of an agreement which provides that the trustee shall keep the
trust fund invested in good municipal bonds yielding not less than
4%, and suppose that no such bonds are available. There is an-
other rule which says that the trustee is not under a duty to the
beneficiary to comply with the terms of the trust requiring him
to do something which is impossible. Here is the trap. Under
circumstances where it is impossible to comply with the terms of
the trust; for instance, where it is impossible to buy 4% munici-
pals, the court will permit or direct the trustee to deviate from
the specific terms of the trust in order that the general purposes
of the trust may be carried out, and the trustee may be personally
liable if he neglects to apply to the court for permission to deviate.
It has been said that the invention and development of the
trust is the most important and distinctive achievement of Anglo-
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Saxon law. That statement might be questioned when we think
of such institutions as the jury, but the importance of the trust
in American life cannot be denied. Property of the value of sixty
billions or perhaps more is now held in trust. The administration
of trusts, and that includes decedent's estates, is as hazardous as
it is important, as I have attempted to demonstrate, and always
is accompanied by the element of contingent liability. Every law-
yer who deals with trusts or trustees, executors, or administra-
tors, should be aware of the dangers, and the collateral opportuni-
ties, which pertain to the law of trusts.
SUPREME COURT AMENDS RULES ON
ADMISSION
IN THE SUPREME COURT:
AMENDMENT TO RULE 202
Insert after paragraph B of Rule 202:
Provided, that if the jurisdiction from which an applicant in
Class A or B applies, imposes by any law, rule or regulation;
limitations, restrictions or conditions upon the admission of mem-
bers of the bar of the State of Colorado seeking admission to the
bar of such jurisdiction, this Court may impose like restrictions,
limitations or conditions upon any such applicant seeking admis-
sion to the bar of this state.
Adopted by the Court en banc May 8, 1953.
AMENDMENT TO RULE 226
Rule 226 is amended to read as follows:
226. Any attorney and counselor at law in good standing
from any other jurisdiction in the United States, may in the dis-
cretion of any court of record in this state, be permitted to par-
ticipate before such court in the trial or argument of any particu-
lar cause in which, for the time being, he is employed. Provided.
that a member in good standing of the bar of this court is associated
in such cause at all stages thereof.
Neither disbarred attorneys nor persons whose applications
for examination or admission have been rejected for failure to
show good character will be permitted to practice before any
justice of the peace of this state.
Adopted by the Court en banc May 14, 1953.
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